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Reducing Acidification: The Benefits of Increased Nature Quality. 




In order to complete cost benefit analyses of acidification policies, an attempt was made 
to monetarize the benefits of increased nature quality. So far, several benefits of 
acidification abatement, such as reduced health risks, had been determined, but the 
benefits of increased nature quality were lacking, although nature is actually one of the 
most important reasons for abating acidification in the Netherlands.  
This study shows that CVM can be used to estimate two specific benefits of increased 
nature quality due to acidification abatement: the non-use value and the recreational 
perception value. For other benefits, other valuation methods are needed. This study 
also shows that CVM is not suited for specifying benefits of different acidification 
scenarios, which differ little in physical effects on ecosystems. If abatement scenarios 
are rather extreme, it may be possible to differentiate benefits per scenario.  
A CVM questionnaire was designed to determine the difference between the welfare 
generation of healthy ecosystems not suffering from acidification and unhealthy 
ecosystems affected by acidification. A striking result of the pre test was that all 
respondents were familiar with the environmental theme of acidification. The results of 
the pre test suggest that the benefits of nature may be quite large and that they should 
therefore not be overlooked. 
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Acidification and continental air pollution is one of the main themes of the Dutch national
environmental policy. This theme pertains to chemicals (SO2, NOx, NH3 and VOS) in the air which
form acids and nitrogen when deposited on the soil or in water. Also ozone and certain organic
compounds are incorporated in the environmental theme of acidification. The abatement of
acidification leads to costs, but at the same time it results in several benefits, such as reduced risk of
mortality and morbidity, less damage to historical buildings, less damage to agricultural crops and
increased nature quality.
In 2001, consultant Witteveen en Bos did a study investigating the socio-economic benefits of
increased nature quality due to acidification abatement (Ruijgrok en Nieuwkamer (a), 2001). In this
study the benefits of increased nature quality were determined by finding out which functions nature
can perform better when is not affected by acidification compared to when it is. The study resulted in a
first rough benefit estimate of Euro 245 million per year. This estimate was based on the fulfillment of
several ecosystem functions. The regulation function ‘fixation of heavy metals in the soil’ accounted
for the largest part of the total benefits. The calculations of the benefits related to this function were,
however, very uncertain due to a lack of information on the physical effects of acidification on the
behavior of metals. Besides this regulation function, the non-use value of increased biodiversity and
vitality of nature, was identified as an important component of the total benefits.
In October 2001 a national workshop was organized in which the results of the initial study were
discussed. This workshop resulted in a program for further research. The first three research activities
of this program were (Ruijgrok en Nieuwkamer (b), 2001):
-  estimating the reduced cost of drinking water production due to acidification abatement;
-  estimating the reduced costs of nature management due to reduced acidification;
-  estimating the non-use value of increased nature quality by means of the Contingent Valuation
Method.
This study concentrates solely on setting up a CVM-survey to determine the non-use value of increased
nature quality (i.e. increased biodiversity and vitality) due to acidification abatement. Since CVM can
also be used to determine the recreational perception value of increased nature quality, this is also
included in this study. The aim of this study is to investigate the possibilities of CVM in determining
the socio-economic benefits of acidification abatement scenarios.3
2. Valuation by means of the Contingent Valuation Method
This chapter presents a short introduction to the socio-economic valuation of nature. In paragraph 2.1 it
is explained which components of the total economic value of increased nature quality are measured in
this study. Paragraph 2.2. introduces the Contingent Valuation Method and in paragraph 2.3 the
limitations of this method are briefly discussed.
2.1 Valuation of nature
Acidification abatement has several benefits, such as reduced health risks and increased natural
qualities. The value of increased natural qualities can be determined by investigating which welfare
functions nature can perform better when it is not affected by acidification compared to when it is. The
results of an earlier study (Ruijgrok and Nieuwkamer (a), 2001) indicate that the non-use function is
probably positively influenced by acidification abatement.
To enable a cost benefit comparison for acidification scenarios, the effect of acidification abatement on
the non-use value of nature needs to valued in monetary terms.  The only method available for the
monetarisation of the non-use function is the Contingent Valuation Method.  Figure 2.1.1 gives an
overview of the different ecosystem’s functions and appropriate valuation methods.
Figure 2.1.1 The components of the total economic value of nature
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Nature generates welfare for society by means of use and non-use functions. Consequently, the total
economic value of nature consists of several components (Pearce and Moran, 1994; Hanley and Spash,
1997). The total economic value is the sum of  the use value and the non-use value. The use value
comprises a direct use value and an indirect use value. The non-use value consists of an option value,  an
existence value and a bequest value.
Direct use values pertain to tradeable goods such as fish and wood (production values) and to services
such as the possibilities for recreators to enjoy natural beauty (information values). Indirect use values
refer to supportive features of  ecosystems for direct use, such as climate regulation (regulation values).
Option values are values that people attach to keeping the possibility of particular kind of use open for the4
future, whereas quasi-option values concern some kind of unknown future use. Bequest values pertain to
the value people attach to preserve natural assets for future generations. Existence values refer to the fact
that people simply want certain functions or species to exist, regardless of whether or not they will ever
use them
2.
Figure 2.1.1 shows that only the non-use function and the information function (read: the recreational
perception function) can be valued by means of CVM. Therefore only these two functions are taken
into consideration in this CVM-pilot. For the valuation of other ecosystems’ functions that are
influenced by acidification, separate studies are done using other valuation methods.
It is important to note here that economic value of nature only reflects the amount of welfare that
society derives from nature. Because rational people are willing to pay more for things that bring them
much welfare than for  things that do not, willingness to pay is a logical measure for the value of
nature. Scientists from other disciplines and also some economists (e.g. Dietz et al., 1992) may,
however, raise the question whether welfare for humans is the ultimate measure of the value of nature.
What about welfare for other organisms? The economic interpretation of value is purely
anthropocentric. In principle, it does not allow for a value of nature in itself. An intrinsic valuation of
nature requires an ecocentric approach.
In other words: the socio-economic values of nature only capture human welfare, and they do not
include welfare of other organisms. Therefore, it seems reasonable to suggest that environmental
policies should not be based solely on economic values. The benefits of increased nature quality due to
acidification abatement are larger than the economic benefits determined in this study. It might be
useful to determine the ecological or intrinsic value of nature in addition to its economic value.
2.2  What is CVM?
CVM is a survey method in which respondents are asked how much they are willing to pay for the use or
conservation of natural goods
3. Their stated preferences are assumed to be contingent upon the alternative
goods that are offered in a ‘hypothetical market’. Essential elements of the survey are: description of the
natural good that is to be valued, description of the payment vehicle and description of the hypothetical
market (Mitchell and Carson, 1989; Hoevenagel, 1994). Describing the natural good includes identifying
all valuable attributes of the good. In the case of nature quality related to acidification, this would entail a
clear description of the negative effects of acidification on natural qualities, such as reduced biodiversity
and vitality of ecosystems. The payment vehicle pertains to how the money will be paid. For example, one
can pay for a good in cash every time it is used or by means of an increased income tax. The description
of the hypothetical market should include an identification of who will provide and who will pay for the
nature improvement. It should be made clear that the payment is a collective action; everybody else will
also pay, otherwise respondents may refuse to pay although they appreciate the good. Respondents should
also be reminded of the possibility of spending their income on goods other than nature, to prevent
overestimates (Hoevenagel, 1994).
CVM measures stated preferences and it includes the consumers’ surplus. It is said to be an appropriate
economic valuation method for environmental goods that have no indirect effects on other goods. It is
therefore suited for the valuation of amenities or other easy to perceive aspects of nature, such as natural
beauty.  CVM does not produce valid measurements when it concerns goods that people are not familiar
with. Since people are probably not very familiar with the effects of acidification on nature (although acid
rain is widely known), it is very important to explain the effects of acidification on nature very well. CVM
also does not work when people reject responsibility for the good in question (de Boer et al., 1997). If
people are asked, for example, about their willingness to pay for clean soil, they may state that it is zero,
because they feel the polluter should pay. This does not mean that they do not appreciate clean soil.
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2.2  Limitations and biases
Although CVM-studies are known to have large data requirements, they do not require secondary data.
One can gather all necessary data, i.e. the willingness to pay and its explaining variables such as income
and attitude towards nature, by means of one survey (Hoevenagel, 1994).
In CVM-surveys one can encounter various sources of bias, such as samples which are not representative,
strategic behaviour of respondents or confusion about the size of the good that is to be valued (part-whole
bias). Three main categories of bias can be distinguished:
1.  The respondent does not state his or her actual willingness to pay;
2.  The design of the questionnairry influences the answers;
3.  Unfamiliarity with and difficulty of the questions.
Category 1: The respondent does not state his or her actual willingness to pay
Sometimes respondents do not state their true willingness to pay because they wish to influence the
results of the study. This strategic behaviour can be minimised by choosing a realistic payment vehicle.
Other times respondents may answer to please the interviewer or in a socialy desirable way. This is
difficult to prevent, but one can pay attention to giving respondents the opportunity to simply say  that
they do not agree or are not willing to pay. This is done in the survey design of this study: e.g.
repondents are explicitly asked whether they find the issue of nature and acidification important and it
is particularly pointed out to them that there are other things they might prefer to spend their money on,
thus inviting them to speak their mind.
Category 2: The design of the questionnairry influences the answers
The information provided in the questionnairre may influence the willingness to pay. This may happen
with closed questions. The starting  bid and the range of monetary bids,  may result in a different
willingness to pay than the respondent’s actual willingness to pay.  To prevent this type of bias, open
ended questions were used in the survey of on nature and acidification. Of course open ended questions
introduce the risk of relational bias, which means that respondents relate their bids to the prices of other
goods. In principle it is okey when they relate entrance fees of nature areas with entrance fees of
museums. They can only spend their money once,  so they have to choose between different goods. But it
becomes problematic when the relate their bid to other things that do not cost anything, such as rain or
friendship. Also the payment vehicle may be a source of bias. One must however choose at least one
vehicle. When using more vehicles one can determine the sensitivity of the results to the vehicle. One can
also register respondents who protest against the selected vehicle. The latter was done in the survey on
nature and acidification.
Category 3: Unfamiliarity with and difficulty of the questions.
Sometimes respondents do not fully grasp the budget constraint on which they should base their
willingness to pay.  When it concerns small payments, such as entrance fees for areas, the risk of  budget
bias is rather small, but when it larger bids are made,  such as yearly donations for nature conservation,
the risk becomes larger too.  Respondent may produce bids they that could never live up to in reality. In
the CVM-design of this study,  respondents are reminded of the fact that there are other things on which
they may wish to spent their income. Other sources of bias pertain to mentioning symbolic values and to
not realising that they would actually have to pay the amount (elicitation bias). Also combining questions
on the non-use and the (recreational) use value, may lead to biased results,  as the answer to the first
question influences the answer to the second question.  It does, however, save research cost to determine
two values in one survey. Finally, an important type of bias is the part-whole bias,  which occurs when
people value more than they were supposed to. For example, they were asked to value a tree, but they
valued the whole forest instead. This can be prevented by using a filter: first, they are asked to value the
forest, and than to value the tree. Even if this this done, one cannot fully exclude part whole bias,
especially not when valuing such a difficult good, such as the effects of acidification on nature quality.  In
the survey design of this study,  respondents who are likely to have valued more than just acidification
effects, were registered as ‘whole bidders’. It is,  however, debateble that part-whole bias can be ascribed
to the survey design,  because respodents may simply not have additive preferences (Bateman, et.al,
1997). In that case one should not even use the word bias.6
3 Setting up a CVM-survey
In this chapter, a CVM-survey is set up to determine the effects of acidification abatement on the non-
use value and the recreational perception value of nature in the Netherlands. In paragraph 3.1 the good
to be valued and the hypothetical market are described. In paragraph 3.2 the questionnaire is discussed
and in paragraph 3.3. the results of the pre test are summarised.
3.1 Description of the good and the hypothetical market
CVM can be used to estimate non-use value and the information value, from here on referred to as
perception value of nature. In order to estimate the effect of acidification on both the non-use and the
perception value of nature in the Netherlands, a CVM- questionnaire was made. The most important
ingredients of the questionnaire were a description of the good to be valued and the hypothetical
market, including a payment vehicle.
Non-use value
The good to be valued was the effect of acidification on nature quality. For the estimation of the non-
use value, it was described by means of a short story explaining what acidification is and how it affects
the quality of nature in the Netherlands. In this description the effects on species of forests, heath, grass
lands, fens and dunes were explained by means of examples. Difficult expert words, such as
biodiversity, were not used to ensure that respondents could fully understand the issue.
The hypothetical market was kept extremely simple, but two variants were introduced in order to find
out which variant is most suited for the Dutch situation. The first variant stated that it would be
possible to reduce acidification in the Netherlands through extra environmental measures to such an
extent that all nature in the Netherlands would be completely healthy again in the year 2030 (i.e. all the
negative effects as indicated in the short story would not come true). Respondents were asked if they
would be willing to donate a yearly amount of money to actually make that happen. The second variant
stated that without extra measures to abate acidification, the quality of nature would be reduced greatly
in the year 2030 (i..e. all the negative effects descirbed in the short story would come true).
Respondents were asked how much they would be willing to pay in the form of a yearly donation to
prevent this deterioration of nature quality.
In the hypothetical market no special effort was made to point out that acidification abatement is a
collective action. Previous experience (i.e. Ruijgrok en Vlaanderen, 2001) has indicated that Dutch
respondents do not find this important. Whether others pay or not does not influence their willingness
to pay when it comes to non-use (although it does when it concerns recreational use!). When
respondents say they feel that they have already paid taxes for the abatement of acidification, extra
information is given. In the case of the tax argument,  respondents are confronted with the assumption
that this issue is no longer paid for through national taxes. If this does not produce a willingness to pay,
the respondent is registered as a protest bidder, because he may actually be willing to pay, but he does
simply not agree with the proposed payment vehicle of a donation.
The description of the hypothetical market does clearly indicate that there are other things, good
causes, where the respondent might wish to spend his money on. This is specifically mentioned to both
reduce part-whole bias (there are more environmental problems than acidification)  and budget
contstraint bias (‘you can only spent your money once’) and to prevent an overestimation of the
willingness to pay due to socially correct answering.
Perception value
The perception value that is estimated in this CVM-study pertains to recreational use. It is the welfare
effect of recreational enjoyment, and not the income generating effect for the recreation sector.7
The good to be valued was not described in words but shown on pictures. Respondents were shown
pictures of healthy forests, health lands, grass lands, fens and dunes and of unhealthy ones suffering
from the effects of acidification. The pictures were selected in such a way that they give a realistic
impression of the Dutch situation. They were not too technical, nor too extreme. In other words: they
did not show dead trees in fall at bad weather conditions versus beautiful trees in spring in good
weather conditions.
The hypothetical market included the assumption that an entrance fee was installed for visiting all
nature areas in the Netherlands. This was done to indicate that others would also have to pay and that
evasion was not possible. The assumption continued by saying that the fees differ per area. Then
respondents were asked if they would bewilling to pay more for a visit to a healthy, unaffected area
than for a visit to an area suffering from acidification. Respondents were offered the opportunity to
indicate that their willingness to pay was not influenced by the effects of acidification. After all, this
study investigates the valuation of the effects of acidification on nature and not the valuation of nature
in general.
Distinguishing different levels of acidification
The aim of the Dutch Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and Environment is to determine the
effects of acidification on both the non-use and the perception value of nature for different deposition
levels. This was however found to be practically impossible within a CVM-questionnaire when it
concerns small exceedances of critical loads.
For the non-use value the distinction of different deposition levels would entail different descriptions of
the effects of acidification. This would have to result in different little stories per acidification scenario
for the respondents. These stories would then, however, only differ in the species that were mentioned.
For respondents the difference between those stories would become unnoticeable. An alternative to
different stories, would be extra questions, asking respondents for their willingness to pay to make
nature 50 % healthier,  25 % healthier etc. This was not done, because one can be sure that respondents
will not understand this and simply divide their original willingness to pay for healthy nature by two or
by four out of courtesy to the interviewer.
In order to introduce different levels of acidification in the questions on the perception value, it would
be necessary to show pictures reflecting different levels of acidification. After visiting Dutch experts on
nature and acidification, it was concluded that this is not possible for the Dutch situation.
Instead of trying to distinguish different levels of acidification, by explaining the different physical
effects on nature at different deposition levels, it was decided to add an extra question concerning the
time span for nature quality to either ameliorate or deteriorate. The different acidification scenarios
used by the Ministry to derive environmental quality objectives and emission objectives for the year
2010, actually represent different time paths to one and the same deposition level from the year 2020
and onwards.  Figure 3.1.1 shows the ammonium deposition for the different scenarios in the period
1997- 2050.8


























Source: Kros et.al., 2000.
Scenario A: The Netherlands adhere to the National Emission Ceiling, while the rest of Europe follows
the Gothenburg protocol;
Scenario B: Emissions as in A, but ammonium emissions are spatially optimised per province, i.e.
minimisation of the effects of nitrogen deposition on nature (not shown in Figure 3.2.1);
Scenario C: Emissions of EU nations according to the NEC, while other countries follow the
Gothernburg protocol;
Scenario D: All countries follow the Gothenburg protocol;
Secnario E: The Netherlands adopt an extra strong policy, while other countries conform to the
Gothenburg protocol;
Figure 3.1.1 shows that all scenarios result in the same deposition level and thus in the same effects on
nature from the year 2020 onwards. The final deposition level is reached in 2030. In the year 2010 the
scenarios differ. In accordance with this picture, respondents were asked about their willingness to pay
to realise a good nature quality (i.e. the quality that is expected when critical loads are not surpassed) in
2030. On top of that they were asked whether they would be willing to more to reach this quality
sooner, in 2010. If respondents react positively to that question, this is an indication that Scenario E is
preferred to the other scenarios, as E is the scenario that leads to the lowest deposition levels in 2010. It
represents the fastest path to the final deposition level.
From the above one can conclude that CVM is only suited to distinguish nature benefits of acidification
abatement scenarios, when these scenarios differ much in physical effects on nature; so much that they
clearly present different stories and different pictures. If one wishes to differentiate the benefits of
several scenarios that rather limited in physical effects on nature, one could come to agreements or
decision rules on how to derive the benefits of these non-extreme scenarios from the extreme scenarios,
e.g. by extrapolation. Of course, benefit estimates derived in such a way cannot be validated.
3.2. Questionnaire
The complete Dutch CVM-questionnaire (adapted on the basis of the pre test) including the
environmental good, hypothetical market and payment vehicle as described in paragraph 3.1, is
presented in Appendix I. The questionnaire consists of open ended questions and was designed for
personal interviews on the street, in nature areas or at home. Open ended questions were used to
prevent starting point bias. An average an interview took 10 to 15 minutes. The interviews were kept
short because this increases the number of people willing to participate (when asked for an interview,
Dutch respondents always ask how much time it will take before agreeing) and to prevent the break off
of interviews before they are finished.
The interview starts with some questions concerning general information on the respondents such as
their attitude towards nature, their domicile and postal code (which enables researchers to perform
detailed statistical tests on difference responses related to different neighbourhoods). The first
introductory question on acidification is: Have you ever heard of the environmental problem which is9
called acidification? This is followed by: Did you know that acidification has negative effects on the
quality of nature in the Netherlands? These questions are posed to give respondents the opportunity to
start thinking about the issue of acidification and to later perform tests on differences in willingness to
pay of people who were and who were not aware of acidification and its effects on nature before the
interview.
After these introductory questions respondents are given a short explanation on acidification and its
effects on the quality of different ecosystems (forests, heath, grass lands , fens and dunes). After that
they are asked whether they find it important to abate acidification and its negative effects on nature,
and why. This question gives respondents a chance to first think about the issue of nature quality and
acidification before they take the next step which is determining whether they are willing to pay for
this. Regardless of the answer they are subsequently asked about their willingness to pay. But the
previous question makes it relatively easy for them to simply say that they are not willing to pay for
this issue, because they actually do not find it important. This form of questioning helps to prevent the
leading on of respondents in the line of argumentation that acidification is bad, and they should pay for
it.
In order to determine the willingness to pay,  two different questions were used to find out which one
works best. Fifty percent of the respondents was asked how much they were willing to pay to make the
Dutch nature healthy again in 2030 (i.e. an improvement in quality because depositions are equal to the
critical loads) and fifty percent was asked how much they would be willing to pay to prevent further
deterioration of nature quality and thus to have the same quality in 2030 as today. This was done
because it was expected that some respondents might react negatively to questions considering an
improvement in quality as they feel that the present quality is sufficient. For such respondents a
question pertaining to the prevention of a quality reduction seems better. To check whether it was
actually the non-use value and not the use value that was measured by this question, respondents were
asked whether they were willing to pay the amount they just mentioned when it was spent on areas that
are not accessible to visitors.
The next question pertained to the time span, since the acidification scenarios of the Ministry of
Housing, Spatial Planning and Environment represent different time paths to reach one and the same
lower deposition level (equal to the critical loads). Respondents were asked whether they find it
important that the proposed improvement in quality or prevention of deterioration (depending on the
previous question) would be realised sooner in 2010 instead of in 2030. If so, how much extra they
would be willing to pay for that.
So far, all the questions pertained to the non-use value. In order to make the shift to the perception
value (i.e. recreational use value) respondents were asked about their visits to nature areas. They were
also asked whether they had seen the effects of acidification on nature in reality. After that they were
shown five sets of photos:
- a healthy forest and a forest suffering from acidification;
- a healthy grass land an a grass land suffering from acidification;
- a healthy heath land and a health land suffering from acidification;
- a healthy fen and a fen suffering from acidification;
- a healthy dune area and a dune area suffering from acidification.
After looking at the photos they were asked whether they find the healthy ecosystems more beautiful
than the ones suffering from acidification. The photos were selected in such a way that the unhealthy
ecosystems were not depicted unnecessarily badly. All photos were of comparable quality and
representing a realistic picture of the Dutch situation.
Subsequently, respondents were asked whether they agreed with the assumption of a paying an
entrance fee to all nature areas in the Netherlands, and whether they agreed with paying a higher fee for
beautiful nature, not suffering from acidification than for less beautiful, affected nature. If they did not
agree to this their arguments for not agreeing were noted. They were not asked about their willingness
to pay because this study was purely aimed at finding out the willingness to pay for the effects of
acidification on nature (i.e. the difference between healthy and unhealthy nature) and not at the
willingness to pay for nature in general. If they did, they were asked how much they would be willing
to pay for a visit to a beautiful, unaffected area because of their increased recreational enjoyment and
how much they would be willing to pay for a visit to a less beautiful, affected area because of their10
reduced recreational enjoyment. The difference between those two amounts is the effect of
acidification.
On the questionnaire the interviewers were warned for respondents stating that they are willing to pay
more for unhealthy, affected nature, because it needs more money than healthy nature. This was noted
on the form, because these respondent did not really answer the question. They did not give any
indication of their own recreational enjoyment, but instead argued from the perspective of the needs of
different areas, which is close to non-use.
The interview ended with some questions concerning age, education and income.
3.3 Test results
In order to test the questionnaire described in paragraph 3.2, twenty  interviews were held: ten at the
nature reserve Meijendel along the Dutch coast near The Hague and ten at a shopping area in
Zoetermeer. This was done to find out whether visitors of nature areas respond differently to the
questions than other people. The response rate was approximately 70 %.
The pre test resulted in numerous reactions and findings, which were used to adapt the questionnaire
(see Appendix 1).
Non–use value
Most people had little difficulty in distinguishing recreational perception values (i.e. use) from non-use
values. They quite openly weighed their willingness to pay against their ability to make use of nature
areas. The willingness to pay for non-use values varied from Euro 0 to Euro 100 per household per
year. The average was Euro 30 per household per year. The willingness to pay could not be related to
any of the respondents characteristics such as income, education, affiliation with nature and  the
acidification problem etc. Of course this was not surprising, since only 20 test interviews were held. It
was, however, striking to find that all but one respondent stated that they were familiar with the
problem of acidification and that they were also aware of the negative effects that acidification has on
nature quality.
Another interesting observation was that some respondents attached conditions to their willingness to
pay, demanding that the policy to reduce acidification is consistent and effective and can be shown to
be so. Others wanted to be assured that their contribution will indeed be used to reduce acidification
and not be spent on other things.
Although the photos were shown to ask questions on the recreational perception value, this did not
refrain one respondent to adjust his bid for non-use after he had seen the pictures. His reaction was that
“things were not quite so bad in reality”.  This may regarded as an indication that it is better to both use
the short explanation and to show pictures before asking about the willingness to pay for non-use. This
will however introduce overlap with the perception value.
In a similar way, some respondents argued that acidification is hardly the biggest threat to nature in the
Netherlands, or that the decline of certain species is part of long-term natural dynamics. This argument
provided by a respondents who had a positive willingness to pay,  raises the suspicion that part-whole
bias cannot be fully excluded. The bids of some respondents probably pertained to more than just the
effects of acid deposition in particular, but they concerned a broader idea of ecosystem’s health or
nature quality in general. It is practically impossible to design a CVM-survey in such a way that part-
whole bias is excluded. The best one can do is to register respondents who are apparently (judged by
their arguments) valuing more than just acidification as ‘whole  bidder’, so that the magnitude of this
bias is known. In the survey designed in this study a distinction is therefore made between bidders, zero
bidders, protest bidders and whole bidders. This way, it is always possible to excluded a specific
category of bidders from the analysis. Of course this works best when doing personal interviews, so
that the interviewer can carefully register the arguments. In case of a mailing of interview, additional
questions are needed to determine the type of bidder.11
When asked about attaining a better nature quality (or a stop of the deterioration) in 2010 rather than
2030, half of the respondents were prepared to raise their willingness to pay for non-use if acidification
could be reduced sooner. Contrary to the expectations, this was found for both the users (5 out of 10
people interviewed in the Meijendel, a nature area)  and the non-users (also 5 out of 10 people
interviewed in a shopping area in Zoetermeer). Several respondents stressed that they doubted whether
eight years would be enough to have much of an impact on emissions and the recovery of nature.
The willingness to pay for improvement of nature quality and the willingness to pay for conservation of
the present quality appear to divert less than expected. The pre test results indicate, judged by the high
standard deviations, that the average willingness to pay for improvement and the average willingness to
pay for conservation do not differ. This may be because of the limited number of respondents.
However, it may also have something to do with the questioning, in particular question number 7
option B, in which respondents were asked to value the prevention of a further decline of ecosystem
health in the face of continued acidification. The latter may not be credible to people who believe that
acidification is not a serious problem anymore and, anyway, that the government wouldn’t allow it to
worsen again. This finding leads to the conclusion that one might as well choose option A, willingness
to pay for improvement, since that is what the present acidification policies and the scenarios used by
the Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and Environment aim to realize.
Perception value
Most respondents claimed to have seen the negative effects of acidification on nature in reality. They
also stated that they find unaffected nature more beautiful. Only one respondent had a different
opinion. These answers were, however, given after they had already seen the photos of healthy and
unhealthy nature. This leads to the suspicion that the photos may have stimulated respondents to revise
their opinion based on their own experience that “most nature actually looks pretty healthy”, to “yes, I
see that unaffected nature looks better”.  To prevent an overestimate of their true willingness to pay it
was decided to show the photos two questions later than in the original pre test.
The pre test showed that approximately half of the respondents were willing to pay more for a visit to
an unaffected site than to an affected site. The extra willingness to pay for visits to unaffected beautiful
sites compared to less beautiful sites ranged from Euro 0 to Euro 5 per visit per person. One respondent
was willing to pay user fees only if these would be invested in nature in the concerning area. Two
respondents argued that they would pay more for affected areas that need higher investments.
Interestingly, one respondent argued that it would be unfair to make people pay more for less healthy
nature areas, as it would discriminate against people who are already unfortunate enough to live near
such areas.  As to people’s willingness to pay to visit less beautiful and unhealthy areas, a logical reply
came in the form of “we simply wouldn’t go there”.
People often compared their bids for unaffected areas to what they are used to pay to enter museums
and other attractions. Willingness to pay for recreational use therefore seem fairly robust. It is,
however, essential to emphasize that recreational use values concern utility to the visitor.
The amounts people claim they are prepared to pay to visit nature areas were not checked against the
visiting frequency cited before. It may well be that with entry fees of Euro 6 per person, people will
reduce the number of visits per year.  A question could be added asking respondents if they would
reduce their number of visits if they had to pay the amount they just mentioned. This was done in other
studies (e.g. Ruijgrok and Vlaanderen, 2001), but did not provide any extra information as the vast
majority claimed not to change their visiting frequency. Therefore it seems better to check for
frequency effects during the data analysis.
Currency effect
Previous CVM-studies on the recreational perception values (e.g. van der Veeren, 2000; Ruijgrok en
Vlaanderen, 2001; Ruijgrok, 2000) resulted in bids varying from Dfl. 1 to Dfl. 5 per visit. This pre test
resulted in bids of  Euro 1 to Euro 5 per visit. People appear to bid Euros as if they were Guilders,
inflating their willingness to pay with a factor 2.2 (even after they were asked to confirm their bid in
Euro). This is a phenomenon that affects actual spending too. Since the Euro was introduced earlier
this year, people appear to have difficulty judging prices.12
Implementation at a European scale
The CVM-survey that was designed is this study cannot be applied on a European scale without
adjustments. After translating the questions, a new pre test should be conducted. Cultural differences
may cause totally different reactions and may require serious adaptations of a questionnaire that was
clearly designed for the Dutch situation.
Most likely, the use of other methods than CVM, such  as the Travel Cost Method and the Hedonic
Pricing Method, is not an option. For the Dutch situation these methods were not suited, because the
effects of acidification are not clear enough to lain man: present depositions do not deter recreators
from visiting certain areas, and they do not negatively influence the prices of houses anywhere. If this
is the case in the Netherlands, it is probably even more so in other European countries, since the
Netherlands have relatively high deposition levels.13
4. Conclusions and recommendations
From this CVM-pilot one may conclude that CVM can be used to estimate the non-use and recreational
perception benefits of increased nature quality due to acidification abatement. It can therefore
contribute to completing cost benefit analyses on acidification policies. CVM is, however, less suited
for determining these benefits for different abatement scenarios, especially when scenarios do not
differ much in terms of physical effects on nature. If one wishes to estimate the nature benefits of non-
extreme scenarios, agreements or decision rules on how to derive those from the benefits of more
extreme scenarios may be an acceptable solution.
When carrying out a CVM-survey as designed in this study, one should pay special attention to the
possibility of overlap between the recreational perception value and the non-use value, due to the
showing of photos and the explanation of the effects of acidification on nature. It is probably safer to
ask half of the respondents about non-use and the other half about perception. Of course, this will
increase the costs of carrying out the survey. It is also recommended to carefully register the arguments
that respondents give when stating their willingness to pay, as this may help to reveal part-whole bias.
When respondents indicate that they are willing to pay for healthy nature, regardless of whether this is
realized by acidification abatement or any other measure, it is clear that these respondents value the
whole and not just the effects of acidification on nature. It is even more clear when a respondent
indicates to be willing to pay for nature quality related to acidification, but that he or she does not
believe that acidification is a big threat to nature.
The design presented here, is for personal interviews. For a mailing of written interviews some
questions need to be added concerning the type of bidder, in particular to determine ‘whole bidders’,
respondents who are actually valuing more than they were asked to. This, in order to detect and maybe
even reduce part-whole bias. Also the questionnaire should be transformed in to a sort of leaflet suited
for filling out, including the photos.
For a reliable estimate of the benefits of increased nature quality due to acidification abatement a large
sample should be drawn from the whole Dutch population. In case of personal interviews, interviewers
need to be trained. The set up of the data base of the pre test can be used for registering the collected
data. During the data analysis special attention should be paid to the willingness to pay for visits and
the visiting frequency. For a Europe wide application of CVM, the survey design should be tested and
adapted.
The pretest, presented in this study resulted in an average willingness to pay for non-use of Euro 30 per
househould per year. Multiplied with the 6.9 million households of the Netherlands, this results in a
first rough estimate of Euro 207 million per year. This is just a first impression of the expected
magnitude of the nature benefits of acidification abatement in the Netherlands. It is an indication that
the benefits of increased nature quality due to acidification abatement are worth taking into account.14
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Appendix 2.  Survey form and pictures
Naam enqueteur: RESPONDENT NR.:
Datum:
Locatie:
1. Geslacht: 1. Man 2. Vrouw (omcirkel)
2. Bent u lid van een natuur- of milieubeschermingsorganisatie? 1. Ja 2. Nee (omcirkel)
3. Wat is uw woonplaats? .....................................................
    En wat is uw postcode? .....................................................
4. Heeft u wel eens van het milieuprobleem Verzuring gehoord?  1. Ja 2. Nee (omcirkel)
5.  Weet dat verzuring negatieve effecten heeft op de gezondheid van de natuur in Nederland?
1. Ja 2. Nee (omcirkel)
Vertel de respondent het volgende:
Verzuring heeft betrekking op stoffen in de lucht die,  wanneer zij terecht komen op de bodem of het
water, zuren kunnen vormen. Deze zuren leiden tot aantasting van de natuur. De gezondheid van
bossen gaat er door achter uit. En het aantal verschillende plant- en diersoorten op de hei, in het bos, bij
graslanden en vennen neemt er door af.  Vooral zeldzame soorten verdwijnen. Het gaat slecht met
paddestoelen zoals de cantharel, met mossen, naaldbomen en eiken. De beeldbepalende heide met haar
paarse bloemen verdwijnt langzaam. Ook waterplanten zoals sieralgen en kiezelwieren nemen af in
aantal. Sommige planten krijgen last van schimmelaantastingen en vraat door insecten. Het verdwijnen
van plantensoorten heeft ook gevolgen voor sommige diersoorten. Zo hebben onder andere de rode
bosmier, de zandhagedis, de specht, de nachtzwaluw, de tureluur, de kleine heidvlinder en de
venwitsnuitlibel het moeilijk.
6. Vindt u het belangrijk dat er iets gedaan wordt tegen verzuring om de aantasting van de natuur in
Nederland tegen te gaan? 1. Ja 2. Nee (omcirkel)
Zo ja, waarom? ............................................
Zo nee, waarom niet? ..................................
7. Optie  A:
Stel dat de overheid door extra milieumaatregelen de verzuring in Nederland dusdanig terug dringen,
dat de Nederlandse natuur in het jaar 2030 weer helemaal gezond is. Zou u bereid zijn om daar middels
bijv. een jaarlijkse donatie iets aan bij te dragen?  1. ja 2. nee (omcirkel)
Natuurlijk zijn er veel goede doelen waaraan u uw geld kunt besteden.
Hoeveel zou uw huishouden  maximaal per jaar willen betalen voor verbetering van de kwaliteit van de
Nederlandse natuur door de verzuring te bestrijden?  Euro .............
Wilt u dit bedrag ook betalen wanneer het besteed wordt aan gebieden die niet toegankelijk zijn voor
bezoekers? 1. ja 2. nee (omcirkel)
Zo nee, waarom niet? ...................................................... Lager bedrag: ....................
Codering: 1. Bieder nuv = ja; ja of ja; nee, maar lager bedrag genoemd
2. Bieder uv = ja; nee
3. Nul bieder = nee, ik heb er niets voor over
4. Protest bieder = nee, ik betaal al belasting; ik vindt dat vervuiler moet
betalen
5. Totaal bieder = dit wil ik in z’n algemeenheid voor natuur betalen, niet specifiek
voor verzuringsbestrijding17
7. Optie B:
Wanneer de overheid geen extra maatregelen treft om de verzuring te bestrijden, zal de kwaliteit van de
natuur in Nederland in het jaar 2030 aanzienlijke verslechterd zijn. Zou u bereid zijn om middels een
donatie iets te betalen om de huidige kwaliteit te behouden? 1. Ja 2. Nee (omcirkel)
Natuurlijk zijn er veel goede doelen waaraan u uw geld kunt besteden.
Hoeveel zou uw huishouden  maximaal per jaar voor willen betalen om de huidige kwaliteit te
behouden door de negatieve effecten van verzuring te voorkomen?  Euro .............
Wilt u dit bedrag ook betalen wanneer het besteed wordt aan gebieden die niet toegankelijk zijn voor
bezoekers? 1. ja 2. nee (omcirkel)
Zo nee, waarom niet? ........................................................ Lager bedrag: ....................
Codering: 1. Bieder nuv = ja; ja of ja; nee, maar lager bedrag genoemd
2. Bieder uv = ja; nee
3. Nul bieder = nee, ik heb er niets voor over
4. Protest bieder = nee, ik betaal al belasting; ik vindt dat vervuiler moet
betalen
5. Totaal bieder = dit wil ik in z’n algemeenheid voor natuur betalen, niet specifiek
voor verzuringsbestrijding
8. A  Ik heb u zojuist gevraagd naar een verbetering van de natuurkwaliteit in het jaar 2030. Dat is nog
ver weg. Vindt u het belangrijkrijk dat de kwaliteitsverbetering al eerder, bijv. in 2010, gerealiseerd
wordt? 1. Ja 2. Nee (omcirkel)
Zo ja, zou u daarvoor iets extra’s willen betalen ten opzichte van het bedrag dat u zojuist noemde? 
1. Ja, ............ extra per hh per jaar 2. Nee (omcirkel en vul in)
8. B  Ik heb u zojuist gevraagd naar het behouden van de huidige kwaliteit, hetgeen overeenkomt met
het voorkomen van een veslechtering van de natuurkwaliteit in het jaar 2030. Dat is nog ver weg. Vindt
u het belangrijkrijk dat de verslechtering al eerder, bijv. in 2010, een halt wordt toe geroepen?
1. Ja 2. Nee (omcirkel)
Zo ja, zou u daarvoor iets extra’s willen betalen ten opzichte van het bedrag dat u zojuist noemde? 1.
Ja, ............ extra per hh per jaar 2. Nee (omcirkel en vul in)
9. Bezoekt u wel eens natuurgebieden in Nederland? 1. Ja 2. Nee (omcirkel)
Zo ja, ongeveer hoeveel keer per jaar?  .................................... maal per jaar
10. Heeft u zelf de effecten van verzuring gezien in Nederland? 1. Ja 2. Nee (omcirkel)
Laat de respondent foto’s zien:
Dit is een foto van een gezond bos/heide/grasland/ven.
Dit is een foto van een zelfde bos/heide/grasland/ven dat last heeft van verzuring
11. Vindt u natuur die niet door verzuring is aangetast mooier dan natuur die wel door verzuring is
aangetast? 1. Ja 2. Nee, ...................................
(vul reden in als respondent die noemt en sla vraag 12
 over)
12. Stel dat u voor het bezoeken van alle natuurgebieden in Nederland toegangsgeld zou moeten
betalen. De toegangsprijzen verschillen echter per gebied. Vindt u het goed wanneer de prijzen voor
mooie, onaangetaste gebieden hoger zijn dan die voor minder mooie door verzuring aangetaste
gebieden? 1. Ja 2. Nee (omcirkel)
Zo ja, hoeveel zou u willen betalen voor een bezoek aan een mooi, niet door verzuring aangetast gebied
omdat u er meer van geniet?  ............. per bezoek per persoon
En, hoeveel zou u willen betalen voor een bezoek aan een minder mooi, wel door verzuring aangetast
gebied, omdat u er minder van geniet? .............. per bezoek per persoon
Zo nee, waarom niet? ..............................................18
Codering 1. Bieder: ja
2. Nulbieder: nee, ik heb er niets extra voor over;  ik ga wel ergens anders heen
3. Protest bieder:  nee, ik ben tegen het heffen van toegangsgeld
Let op: soms willen mensen juist voor de lelijke natuur meer betalen, omdat die volgens hen geld nodig
heeft voor een opknapbeurt. Noteer dit s.v.p!
13. Wat is uw leeftijd?  ........... jaar
14. Wat is uw hoogst genoten opleiding? ..........................
15. Het een erg persoonlijke vraag, maar zou u aan willen geven in welke inkomensklasse uw
huishouden zit?
Guldens Euro’s
Klasse 1. <2500 <1140
Klasse 2. 2500-4000 1140-1820
Klasse 3. 4000-6500 1820-2950
Klasse 4. >6500 >2950
Hartelijk dank voor uw medewerking. 
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